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Case No. 20120147-CA 
INTHE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff / Appellee, 
vs. 
IRENE GARCIA, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from a conviction for distribution of or arranging 
to distribute a controlled substance, a first degree felony. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(ii) (West Supp. 2010). This Court has jurisdiction under 
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(j) (West 2009) (pour-over provision). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
In December 2010, Irene Garcia approached an undercover narcotics 
detective in Pioneer Park, and asked "How much do you need?" or "How 
much do you want?" or "What are you looking for?" When the detective 
told her "forty white" - drug jargon for $40 worth of cocaine - Garcia turned 
to an Hispanic man standing nearby, called "forty" in Spanish, and waved 
him over. While Garcia watched, the man came over, took $40 from the 
detective, and spit out two twists of cocaine. 
1. Was the evidence sufficient to show that Defendant intentionally 
or knowingly agreed, consented, offered, or arranged to distribute a 
controlled substance? 
Standard of Review. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, this 
Court reviews "the evidence and all inferences which may reasonably be 
drawn from it in the light most favorable to the verdict of the jury/' State v. 
Brown, 948 P.2d 337, 343 (Utah 1997). A jury conviction will be reversed 
only when the evidence, viewed in that light, "is sufficiently inconclusive or 
inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which he was 
convicted." Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted.) 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules are 
reproduced in Addendum A: 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) (West Supp. 2010). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND THE CASE1 
A. Summary of facts. 
On the morning of December 9, 2010, Irene Garcia left home, telling 
her niece that she was going to the Wiggam Center in downtown Salt Lake 
City, but that she would return shortly so that they could go Christmas 
shopping. '£.191:189,190,193. 
About an hour later, Garcia approached undercover narcotics 
detective Christopher Johnson, who was working in Pioneer Park, a well-
known drug-trafficking area. R.191.141, 143, 162. Garcia asked Detective 
Johnson, "How much do you want?" or "How much do you need?" or 
"What are you looking for?"2 R.191:143, 165. Detective Johnson, 
understanding Garcia's inquiry to refer to drugs, told her "forty white," 
which, in drug parlance, means $40 worth of cocaine. R. 191:143, 166. 
Garcia then turned to an Hispanic man standing nearby, called "cuarenta," 
meaning forty in Spanish, and gestured for the man to approach. R. 191:143-
1
 Consistent with well-established appellate standards, the facts are 
recited in the light most favorable to the jury verdict. See Brown, 948 P.2d at 
343. 
2
 At trial, Detective Johnson could not remember Garcia's exact 
words, but testified that based on his experience working undercover in 
Pioneer Park, he understood her to be asking him if he wanted to purchase 
drugs. R.191143,165-166. 
( 
144. The man immediately approached Detective Johnson and Garcia. 
R.191144,168-169. After Detective Johnson showed him two twenty dollar 
bills, the man spit out two twists of cocaine and handed them to the 
detective. R.191:144,170. During this transaction, Garcia remained nearby, 
straddling her bicycle. R.191:169. As soon as the transaction was 
completed, Garcia, Detective Johnson, and the Hispanic man immediately 
parted, leaving the park in different directions. R.191:171. A short time 
later, police separately arrested the man and Garcia a short distance from 
the park. R.191:173. 
Garcia did not testify at trial. Her only witness was her niece, 
Cynthia, who testified that Garcia had left home on the morning of 
December 9, 2010, ostensibly to go to the Wiggam Center, which is a short 
distance from Pioneer Park. R.191:190. 
B. Summary of proceedings. 
Garcia was charged with distributing or arranging to distribute a 
controlled substance in a public park, a first degree felony, R.001-003, A 
jury found Garcia guilty. R.164. On January 27, 2012, she was sentenced to 
a suspended sentence of five years to life in prison, and put on supervised 
probation for 36 months. R.175, 176. She timely appealed to the Utah 
Supreme Court, which transferred the appeal to this Court. R.178-179,190. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Garcia claims the evidence presented at trial is insufficient to establish 
she knowingly or intentionally arranged for the distribution of a controlled 
substance. Aplt. Brf. at 13. She argues that the State "failed to prove that 
[she] understood '40 white' to mean cocaine and that she knew the Hispanic 
male dealt cocaine/' Id. at 17. Garcia asserts that "the evidence suggests 
that [she] had no relationship with the Hispanic male, and [that she] was 
merely solicited to translate for unknown individuals while traveling 
through the park to the Wiggam Center." Id. at 14. In other words, Garcia 
claims that the evidence shows that she was an innocent bystander or a 
victim of circumstances rather than - as the jury found - that she knowingly 
assisted a drug deal with an undercover officer. Id. at 14-15. 
In fact, the evidence presented at trial and its reasonable inference 
was more than sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to conclude that Garcia 
was guilty of arranging to distribute a controlled substance. Garcia 
approached the detective; she asked what he wanted; she signaled the drug 
dealer by saying "cuarenta" and beckoning to him; the Hispanic male 
responded to her beckoning, took $40, and gave the detective the exact 
amount and type of drug he had requested while Garcia watched; and 
when the deal was completed, they all immediately left the park. When 
taken together, the evidence is sufficient to support the reasonable inference 
that Garcia knowingly or intentionally arranged for the distribution of a 
controlled substance. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE STATE AT TRIAL 
WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT DEFENDANTS 
CONVICTION FOR DISTRIBUTION OF OR ARRANGING 
TO DISTRIBUTE A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE 
Garcia claims that the evidence was insufficient to support her 
conviction for distribution of or arranging to distribute a controlled 
substance because it did not establish beyond a reasonable doubt that she 
knowingly and intentionally participated in the transaction. Aplt. Brf. at 13-
14. She argues that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to-
reasonably infer that she intended to arrange a drug sale because "the State 
failed to prove that [she] understood '40 white' to mean cocaine and that 
she knew the Hispanic male dealt cocaine/' Aplt. Brf. at 17. But the 
evidence presented at trial, taken in the light most favorable to the jury 
verdict, was more than sufficient to support a reasonable inference that 
Garcia knowingly and intentionally participated in a drug sale. 
To prevail on a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, an 
appellant must show that the evidence, when viewed in the light most 
favorable to the jury verdict, "is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently 
improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant committed the crime of which he was convicted/' State 
v. Hawkins, 967 P.2d 966, 971 (Utah Ct App. 1998) (quoting State v. Hamilton, 
827 P.2d 232, 236 (Utah 1992)) (emphasis added, internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
Utah law prohibits "distributing] a controlled . . . substance, or . . . 
agreefing], consenting], offering], or arrang[ing] to distribute a controlled . 
. . substance." Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(ii). 
To establish that a defendant is guilty of distributing or arranging to 
distribute a controlled substance, the State must "show that an offer, 
agreement, consent, or arrangement to distribute controlled substances was 
made by the defendant and . . . that the behavior was 'engaged in 
knowingly or with intent that such distribution would, or would be likely 
to, occur/" State v. Hester, 2000 UT App 159, f 9, 3 R3d 725, abrogated on 
other grounds by State v. Morales-Torres, 2001 UT App 246. "Any witting or 
intentional lending of aid in the distribution of drugs, whatever form it 
takes, is proscribed by the act . . . . [A]ny act in furtherance of an 
arrangement therefor constitutes the criminal offense described by the 
statute/' State v. Harrison, 601 P.2d 922, 923, 924 (Utah 1979). 
Garcia suggests that she was an innocent bystander in the park who 
was inadvertently caught up in a drug transaction. Aplt. Brf. at 14. She 
claims on appeal that the evidence shows that she was cutting through the 
park on her way to the Wiggam Center, and was "solicited to translate for 
unknown individuals." Id. In support, she points out that neither she nor 
Detective Johnson used the word "cocaine," and she asserts she did not 
know what "forty white" meant, but was "only parroting words without 
understanding the illicit meaning of '40 white/" Id. She further claims that 
she did not have a relationship with the Hispanic man, did not know he 
was a drug dealer, and did not intend to summon him specifically. Id. at 14-
16. She asserts she only gestured in his general direction and could have 
been gesturing to anyone standing nearby. Id. at 14. 
Garcia's argument views the evidence and its reasonable inferences in 
the light most favorable to the defense and not, as the law requires, in the 
light most favorable to the jury verdict. See Hodges v. Gibson Products Co,, 
811 P.2d 151, 156 (Utah 1991) (The appellant "must set out in [her] briefs 
with record references, all the evidence that support the verdict, including 
all valid inferences to that effect, and demonstrate that reasonable people 
would not conclude that the evidence supports the verdict.''). That is 
reason alone to reject Garcia's argument. See State v. Hopkins, 1999 UT 98, \ 
16, 989 P.2d 1065 (holding that failure to meet the marshaling burden is 
grounds alone for rejecting an attack on the sufficiency of the evidence). In 
any event, when the evidence is viewed in its proper light, the evidence was 
more than sufficient to support the jury's verdict that Garcia was no 
unwitting bystander, but knowingly assisted in arranging a drug deal with 
an undercover officer. 
State's evidence, which was uncontroverted, shows that on the 
morning of December 9, 2010, Detective Christopher Johnson, an 
experienced undercover narcotics detective, was working in Pioneer Park, a 
well-known drug-trafficking area. R.191:140-141. Shortly after Detective 
Johnson entered the park, Garcia, who was already there, approached him 
and asked, "How much do you need?" or "How much do you want?" or 
"What are you looking for?"3 R.191:143,165. In the detective's experience, 
Garcia's question was a query as to whether he wanted to purchase drugs. 
R.191:166. In response, Detective Johnson told her "forty white," drug 
jargon for $40 worth of cocaine. R.191:143. Garcia then turned to an 
Hispanic male standing a short distance away, and called out "cuarenta," 
Spanish for forty, and gestured for the man to come over. R.191:144,167. In 
response to her gesture, the man came over and, after Detective Johnson 
showed him forty dollars, spit out two twists of cocaine. R.191:144. 
Detective Johnson and the man exchanged the drugs for the money, and 
Detective Johnson, the man, and Garcia immediately left the park in 
different directions. R.191:170-171. Garcia and the man were arrested 
separately a short distance from the park. R.191:172-173. 
Intent or knowledge can be inferred from "conduct and attendant 
circumstances in the light of human behavior and experience." State v. 
Brooks, 631 P.2d 878, 881 (Utah 1981), overruled in part on other grounds by 
State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393 (Utah 1994). Garcia's conduct - and the 
reasonable inferences drawn from it - unequivocally bespoke her witting 
3
 It is unclear exactly what Garcia said, but, as explained, Detective 
Johnson testified that he understood Garcia to be asking him if he wanted to 
purchase drugs. R.191:166. 
and intentional aiding in the distribution of drugs. Garcia directly 
approached the detective in a high drug-trafficking area and asked "how 
much" he wanted. R.191:143, 165. Garcia showed neither surprise nor 
confusion to the answer of "forty white." Id. Instead, she immediately 
called the number and waved to a man who turned out to be a drug dealer. 
R.191:143-144. The drug dealer immediately responded to her signal 
R.191:144. Once the man reached the detective, Garcia did not leave, but 
remained standing near the pair while the drug transaction transpired. R. 
191:169. The man spontaneously provided the exact quantity and type of 
drug requested by Detective Johnson. R.191:144. Garcia showed no alarm 
or surprise when the man spit out two twists of cocaine and received the 
detective's money in return. Finally, once the drug transaction was 
completed, Garcia, the drug dealer, and Detective Johnson all immediately 
left the park. R.191:170. 
Given the foregoing circumstances, the jury could have reasonably 
H found that Garcia intentionally or knowingly arranged a drug deal. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted on October 9, 2012. 
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Addendum A 
o-n A n rv* A 
Utah Code Annotated § 58-37-8 (West Supp. 2010) Prohibited acts - Penalties 
(1) Prohibited acts A —Penalties: 
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to 
knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent to produce, 
manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit substance; 
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree, consent, offer, 
or arrange to distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance; 
(iii) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to distribute; or 
(iv) engage in a continuing criminal enterprise where: 
(A) the person participates, directs, or engages in conduct which results in 
any violation of any provision of Title 58, Chapters 37,37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d 
that is a felony; and 
(B) the violation is a part of a continuing series of two or more violations of 
Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d on separate occasions that are 
undertaken in concert with five or more persons with respect to whom the 
person occupies a position of organizer, supervisor, or any other position 
of management. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a) with respect to: 
(i) a substance or a counterfeit of a substance classified in Schedule I or II, a 
controlled substance analog, or gammahydroxybutyric acid as listed in 
Schedule III is guilty of a second degree felony and upon a second or 
subsequent conviction is guilty of a first degree felony; 
(ii) a substance or a counterfeit of a substance classified in Schedule III or 
IV, or marijuana, is guilty of a third degree felony, and upon a second or 
subsequent conviction is guilty of a second degree felony; or 
(iii) a substance or a counterfeit of a substance classified in Schedule V is 
guilty of a class A misdemeanor and upon a second or subsequent 
conviction is guilty of a third degree felony. 
(c) Any person who has been convicted of a violation of Subsection (l)(a)(ii) 
or (iii) may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term as 
provided by law, but if the trier of fact finds a firearm as defined in Section 
76-10-501 was used, carried, or possessed on his person or in his immediate 
possession during the commission or in furtherance of the offense, the court 
shall additionally sentence the person convicted for a term of one year to run 
consecutively and not concurrently; and the court may additionally sentence 
the person convicted for an indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run 
consecutively and not concurrently. 
(d) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a)(iv) is guilty of a first 
degree felony punishable by imprisonment for an indeterminate term of not 
less than seven years and which may be for life. Imposition or execution of the 
sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not eligible for probation. 
(2) Prohibited acts B —Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful: 
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a 
controlled substance analog or a controlled substance, unless it was 
obtained under a valid prescription or order, directly from a practitioner 
while acting in the course of the person's professional practice, or as 
otherwise authorized by this chapter; 
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in control of any building, 
room, tenement, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other place knowingly and 
intentionally to permit them to be occupied by persons unlawfully 
possessing, using, or distributing controlled substances in any of those 
locations; or 
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess an altered or 
forged prescription or written order for a controlled substance. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to: 
(i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more, is guilty of a second 
degree felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, marijuana, if the amount is 
more than 16 ounces, but less than 100 pounds, or a controlled substance 
analog, is guilty of a third degree felony; or 
(iii) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in the form of an extracted resin from 
any part of the plant, and the amount is more than one ounce but less than 
16 ounces, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
(c) Upon a person's conviction of a violation of this Subsection (2) subsequent 
to a conviction under Subsection (l)(a), that person shall be sentenced to a one 
degree greater penalty than provided in this Subsection (2). 
(d) Any person who violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to all other 
controlled substances not included in Subsection (2)(b)(i), (ii), or (iii), 
including less than one ounce of marijuana, is guilty of a class B 
misdemeanor. Upon a second conviction the person is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor, and upon a third or subsequent conviction the person is guilty 
of a third degree felony. 
(e) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) while inside the 
exterior boundaries of property occupied by any correctional facility as 
defined in Section 64-13-1 or any public jail or other place of confinement shall 
be sentenced to a penalty one degree greater than provided in Subsection 
(2)(b), and if the conviction is with respect to controlled substances as listed in: 
(i) Subsection (2)(b), the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for an 
indeterminate term as provided by law, and: 
(A) the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted to a term 
of one year to run consecutively and not concurrently; and 
(B) the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for an 
indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run consecutively and 
not concurrently; and 
(ii) Subsection (2)(d), the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for an 
indeterminate term as provided by law, and the court shall additionally 
sentence the person convicted to a term of six months to run consecutively 
and not concurrently, 
(f) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(ii) or (2)(a)(iii) is: 
(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misdemeanor; 
(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A misdemeanor; and 
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a third degree felony, 
(g) A person is subject to the penalties under Subsection (2)(h) who, in an 
offense not amounting to a violation of Section 76-5-207: 
(i) violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) by knowingly and intentionally having in 
the person's body any measurable amount of a controlled substance; and 
(ii) operates a motor vehicle as defined in Section 76-5-207 in a negligent 
manner, causing serious bodily injury as defined in Section 76-1-601 or the 
death of another, 
(h) A person who violates Subsection (2)(g) by having in the person's body: 
(i) a controlled substance classified under Schedule I, other than those 
described in Subsection (2)(h)(ii), or a controlled substance classified under 
Schedule II is guilty of a second degree felony; 
(ii) marijuana, tetrahydrocannabinols, or equivalents described in 
Subsection 58-37-4(2)(a)(iii)(S) or (AA) is guilty of a third degree felony; or 
(iii) any controlled substance classified under Schedules III, IV, or V is 
guilty of a class A misdemeanor, 
(i) A person is guilty of a separate offense for each victim suffering serious 
bodily injury or death as a result of the person's negligent driving in violation 
of Subsection 58-37-8(2)(g) whether or not the injuries arise from the same 
episode of driving. 
(3) Prohibited acts C—Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) to use in the course of the manufacture or distribution of a controlled 
substance a license number which is fictitious, revoked, suspended, or 
issued to another person or, for the purpose of obtaining a controlled 
substance, to assume the title of, or represent oneself to be, a manufacturer, 
wholesaler, apothecary, physician, dentist, veterinarian, or other 
authorized person; 
(ii) to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or attempt to procure the 
administration of, to obtain a prescription for, to prescribe or dispense to 
any person known to be attempting to acquire or obtain possession of, or 
to procure the administration of any controlled substance by 
misrepresentation or failure by the person to disclose receiving any 
controlled substance from another source, fraud, forgery, deception, 
subterfuge, alteration of a prescription or written order for a controlled 
substance, or the use of a false name or address; 
(iii) to make any false or forged prescription or written order for a 
controlled substance, or to utter the same, or to alter any prescription or 
written order issued or written under the terms of this chapter; or 
(iv) to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die, plate, stone, or other 
thing designed to print, imprint, or reproduce the trademark, trade name, 
or other identifying mark, imprint, or device of another or any likeness of 
any of the foregoing upon any drug or container or labeling so as to render 
any drug a counterfeit controlled substance. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (3)(a) is guilty of a third 
degree felony. 
(4) Prohibited acts D — Penalties: 
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a person not authorized 
under this chapter who commits any act declared to be unlawful under this 
section, Title 58, Chapter 37a, Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act, or under Title 58, 
Chapter 37b, Imitation Controlled Substances Act, is upon conviction subject 
to the penalties and classifications under this Subsection (4) if the trier of fact 
finds the act is committed: 
(i) in a public or private elementary or secondary school or on the grounds 
of any of those schools; 
(ii) in a public or private vocational school or postsecondary institution or 
on the grounds of any of those schools or institutions; 
(iii) in those portions of any building, park, stadium, or other structure or 
grounds which are, at the time of the act, being used for an activity 
sponsored by or through a school or institution under Subsections (4)(a)(i) 
and (ii); 
(iv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care facility; 
(v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or recreation center; 
(vi) in or on the grounds of a house of worship as defined in Section 
76-10-501; 
(vii) in a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium, arena, theater, movie 
house, playhouse, or parking lot or structure adjacent thereto; 
(viii) in or on the grounds of a library; 
(ix) within any area that is within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or 
grounds included in Subsections (4)(a)(i), (ii), (iv), (vi), and (vii); 
(x) in the presence of a person younger than 18 years of age, regardless of 
where the act occurs; or 
(xi) for the purpose of facilitating, arranging, or causing the transport, 
delivery, or distribution of a substance in violation of this section to an 
inmate or on the grounds of any correctional facility as defined in Section 
76-8-311.3. 
(b)(i) A person convicted under this Subsection (4) is guilty of a first degree 
felony and shall be imprisoned for a term of not less than five years if the 
penalty that would otherwise have been established but for this Subsection (4) 
would have been a first degree felony. 
(ii) Imposition or execution of the sentence may not be suspended, and the 
person is not eligible for probation. 
(c) If the classification that would otherwise have been established would 
have been less than a first degree felony but for this Subsection (4), a person 
convicted under this Subsection (4) is guilty of one degree more than the 
maximum penalty prescribed for that offense. This Subsection (4)(c) does not 
apply to a violation of Subsection (2)(g). 
(d) (i) If the violation is of Subsection (4)(a)(xi): 
(A) the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate 
term as provided by law, and the court shall additionally sentence the 
person convicted for a term of one year to run consecutively and not 
concurrently; and 
(B) the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for an 
indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run consecutively and 
not concurrently; and 
(ii) the penalties under this Subsection (4)(d) apply also to any person who, 
acting with the mental state required for the commission of an offense, 
directly or indirectly solicits, requests, commands, coerces, encourages, or 
intentionally aids another person to commit a violation of Subsection 
(4)(a)(xi). 
(e) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this Subsection (4) that the actor 
mistakenly believed the individual to be 18 years of age or older at the time of 
the offense or was unaware of the individual's true age; nor that the actor 
( 
mistakenly believed that the location where the act occurred was not as 
described in Subsection (4) (a) or was unaware that the location where the act 
occurred was as described in Subsection (4)(a). 
(5) Any violation of this chapter for which no penalty is specified is a class B 
misdemeanor. 
(6) For purposes of penalty enhancement under Subsections (l)(b) and (2)(c), a 
plea of guilty or no contest to a violation of this section which is held in abeyance 
under Title 77, Chapter 2a, Pleas in Abeyance, is the equivalent of a conviction, 
even if the charge has been subsequently reduced or dismissed in accordance 
with the plea in abeyance agreement. 
(7) A person may be charged and sentenced for a violation of this section, 
notwithstanding a charge and sentence for a violation of any other section of this 
chapter. 
(8) (a) Any penalty imposed for violation of this section is in addition to, and not 
in lieu of, any civil or administrative penalty or sanction authorized by law. 
(b) Where violation of this chapter violates a federal law or the law of another 
state, conviction or acquittal under federal law or the law of another state for 
the same act is a bar to prosecution in this state. 
(9) In any prosecution for a violation of this chapter, evidence or proof which 
shows a person or persons produced, manufactured, possessed, distributed, or 
dispensed a controlled substance or substances, is prima facie evidence that the 
person or persons did so with knowledge of the character of the substance or 
substances. 
(10) This section does not prohibit a veterinarian, in good faith and in the course 
of the veterinarian's professional practice only and not for humans, from 
prescribing, dispensing, or administering controlled substances or from causing 
the substances to be administered by an assistant or orderly under the 
veterinarian's direction and supervision. 
(11) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on: 
(a) any person registered under this chapter who manufactures, distributes, or 
possesses an imitation controlled substance for use as a placebo or 
investigational new drug by a registered practitioner in the ordinary course of 
professional practice or research; or 
(b) any law enforcement officer acting in the course and legitimate scope of 
the officer's employment. 
(12) (a) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on any 
Indian, as defined in Subsection 58-37-2(1) (v), who uses, possesses, or 
transports peyote for bona fide traditional ceremonial purposes in connection 
with the practice of a traditional Indian religion as defined in Subsection 
58-37-2(l)(w). 
(b) In a prosecution alleging violation of this section regarding peyote as 
defined in Subsection 58-37-4(2)(a)(iii)(V), it is an affirmative defense that the 
peyote was used, possessed, or transported by an Indian for bona fide 
traditional ceremonial purposes in connection with the practice of a 
traditional Indian religion. 
(c) (i) The defendant shall provide written notice of intent to claim an 
affirmative defense under this Subsection (12) as soon as practicable, but 
not later than 10 days prior to trial. 
(ii) The notice shall include the specific claims of the affirmative defense, 
(iii) The court may waive the notice requirement in the interest of justice 
for good cause shown, if the prosecutor is not unfairly prejudiced by the 
lack of timely notice. 
(d) The defendant shall establish the affirmative defense under this 
Subsection (12) by a preponderance of the evidence. If the defense is 
established, it is a complete defense to the charges. 
(13) If any provision of this chapter, or the application of any provision to any 
person or circumstances, is held invalid, the remainder of this chapter shall be 
given effect without the invalid provision or application. 
